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INTRODUCTION
The topic of this year's Symposium, "Equal Protection After the
Rational Basis Era: Is It Time To Reassess the Current Standards of
Review?," is most apt. While the number and content of the stan-
dards of review has been a source of much commentary over the past
fifty years,' recent Supreme Court cases suggest that the justices are at
a crucial point in their elaboration of the doctrine regarding stan-
dards of review. The "right" or the "wrong" road could be taken in
the next few years. Mapping out these two roads is the subject of this
Article.
In a 1992 article, I discussed six standards of review used by the
Supreme Court to analyze the constitutionality of legislation.2 A sec-
ond article, in 1995, discussed how the Supreme Court's intervening
cases were consistent with, or in a few cases were not consistent with,
the analysis suggested in 1992.' Although traditional black-letter law
continues to discuss three basic standards of review-minimum ra-
tionality review, intermediate or mid-level review, and strict scru-
• Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. B.A., 1976, University of Chicago; J.D.,
1979, University of Wisconsin. I wish to thank the members of the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Constitutional Law for their hospitality during the Symposium. Particular thanks goes
to Symposium EditorJenna MacNaughton.
' See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Modelfor NewerEqual Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972);Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Struc-
ture: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161 (1984); Peter S. Smith,
The Demise of Three-Tier Review: Has the United States Supreme Court Adopted a "Sliding Scale" Ap-
proach Toward Equal Protection Jurisprudence?, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 475 (1997); Joseph Tussman &
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL L. REv. 341, 343-65 (1949). See also
Leonard G. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048 (1968) (dis-
cussing standards of review in First Amendment and Due Process Clause cases); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content Regulation and theFirst Amendmen4 25 WMl. & MARYL. REv. 189 (1983).
' R. Randall Kelso, Filling Gaps in the Supreme Court's Approach to Constitutional Review of Legis-
lation: Standards, Ends, and Burdens Reconsidered 33 S. TEX. L. REV. 493 (1992).
' R. Randall Kelso, Three Years Hence: An Update on Filling Gaps in the Supreme Court's Approach
to Constitutional Review of Legislation, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 1 (1995).
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tiny 4-actual Supreme Court cases continue to reflect the six stan-
dards of review discussed in my previous articles.5 Indeed, recent
cases suggest a variation of strict scrutiny, "loose" strict scrutiny,
which, as discussed below, fits neatly into the scheme previously pre-
sented.6 Explicit adoption of this seventh standard of review would
create a "base" level of minimum rationality review, "plus six" levels of
heightened scrutiny: two heightened levels of rational review; two
kinds of intermediate scrutiny; and two kinds of strict scrutiny.7
Adopting this "base plus six" model would bring proper closure to a
structured, but flexible approach towards levels of scrutiny of gov-
ernmental action.
A major threat to this approach is represented by a few cases over
the past few years-particularly Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,"
United States v. Virginia,9 and Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party-
that have used language which, if adopted as controlling, would
create eighth, ninth, and tenth levels of scrutiny. This proliferation
would decidedly not promote predictable or principled application
of the law.
The intent of this Article is to discuss the various levels of scrutiny
and to provide a rethinking of the recent troublesome cases. Part I of
this Article discusses the current standards of review in terms of the
"base plus six" approach. Part II discusses the problems posed by the
possibility of increased proliferation of levels suggested in some of
the recent cases. Part III provides a solution for these problems.
Since all of the recent troublesome cases are capable of reconceptu-
alization as part of the "base plus six" model suggested in this Article,
the Court should simply stick to that model instead of muddying the
waters with loose unfocused language. The "base plus six" model
provides sufficient flexibility in terms of giving the Supreme Court
choices for the appropriate level of scrutiny, while providing needed
predictability and guidance to lower courts in their application of
whatever level of scrutiny is applied. Part IV provides a brief conclu-
sion.
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 529 (1997)
("Under strict scrutiny a law is upheld if it is proven necessary to achieve a compelling govern-
ment purpose."); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 638-46 (6th
ed. 2000).
See infra text accompanying notes 11-40.
6 This seventh standard of review appears in Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996), and is
based upon United States v. Paradis4 480 U.S. 149, 184 (1987). See infra text accompanying notes
41-46.
A summary of these levels appears in an Appendix, infra.
512 U.S. 753 (1994), discussed infra notes 47-50.
518 U.S. 515 (1996), discussed infranotes 51-55.
'0 520 U.S. 351 (1997), discussed infra notes 57-64.
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I. THE CURRENT STANDARDS OF REVIEW AS REFLECTING THE
"BASE PLUS SIx" MODEL OF REVIEW
A. Explicit Standards of Review
Whenever the Supreme Court reviews legislation, whether under
the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, or the First
Amendment, the Court considers whether the legislation represents a
good enough fit to pass constitutional review." This inquiry typically
has three components.
The first inquiry is what governmental interests support a statute's
constitutionality. Depending on the standard of review, the govern-
mental interests must be legitimate or. permissible; important, sub-
stantial, or significant; or compelling or overriding.1 2  Of course, the
governmental interest to support a statute may be impermissible or
illegitimate, and thus not support the statute under any standard of
review.
3
The second inquiry concerns the relationship between the stat-
ute's means and how it advances those governmental ends. Depend-
ing on the standard of review, the statute must have a rational rela-
tionship, a substantial relationship, or a direct relationship to its
ends. 4
" See generally R. Randall Kelso, Considerations of Legislative Fit Under Equal Protection, Substan-
tive Due Process, and Free Speech Doctrine: Separating Questions of Advancement, Relationship and Bur-
den, 28 U. RiCH. L. REV. 1279 (1994) (exploring different aspects of legislative "fit" analysis to
provide a more structured approach to questions of equal protection, due process, and free
speech).
" Id. at 1286-88. To reflect the most common terminology used by the Court, the terms le-
gitimate governmental interest, important or substantial governmental interest, and compelling
governmental interests are used in the remainder of this Article. See id. at 1286-87 nn.32-33.
's See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (finding "animus" against a politi-
cally unpopular group, in this case animus based upon sexual orientation, an illegitimate gov-
ernmental interest); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)
(holding prejudice against the mentally impaired is illegitimate); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429, 433 (1984) (finding prejudice against interracial marriage illegitimate). As Professor Ed-
win Baker, of the University of Pennsylvania, noted in his Introductory Address at this Sympo-
sium, this issue of the "illegitimacy" of some governmental ends is a "normative" issue, while the
remaining inquiries, which focus on the relationship between the statute's means and its ends,
are "instrumental" questions. Professor Edwin Baker, Introductory Address at the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law Symposium: Equal Protection After the Rational
Basis Era (Feb. 2-3, 2001) (videotape on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Consti-
tutional Law). This normative issue is best conceived as a question of law for "de novo" review
by courts on appeal, while the instrumental means/ends questions are best viewed as fact ques-
tions subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard of deference on appeal. See infra notes 159-60
and accompanying text.
" SeeKelso, supra note 11, at 1288-97. As discussed therein, this relationship inquiry actually
"has two parts: (1) the extent to which the statute fails to regulate all individuals who are part
of some problem (the underinclusiveness inquiry); and (2) the way in which the statute serves
to achieve its benefits on those whom the statute does regulate (the service inquiry)." Id. at
1281. Though under a "pristine" analysis, the Court probably should consider only the under-
Jan. 20021
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The third inquiry focuses on the burdens imposed by the statute's
means. Depending on the standard of review, the statute's burden
must not be irrational, substantially more burdensome than neces-
sary, or it must be the least restrictive burden that would be effective
in advancing the governmental interests.'5
The three main standards of review track the responses to these
three questions. Thus, under minimum rationality review, the legisla-
tion only has to be rationally related to legitimate government inter-
ests, and not impose irrational burdens on individuals." Under in-
termediate review, the legislation must be substantially related to
advancing important or substantial governmental interests, and not
be substantially more burdensome than necessary to advance these
interests.17  Under strict scrutiny, the statute must directly advance
compelling governmental interests and be the least restrictive effec-
tive means of doing so. 8
The Court determines which standard of review to adopt in each
case by considering a myriad of factors that counsel the Court either
inclusiveness inquiry under equal protection analysis, and reserve the service inquiry for due
process analysis, the Court has not typically disciplined its analysis in this way. See idL at 1293-94.
For discussion of why a pristine analysis would lead to this result, see infra note 15.
'5 See Kelso, supra note 11, at 1298-1305. As discussed therein, the burden inquiry "also has
two parts: (1) the extent to which the statute imposes burdens on individuals who are not in-
tended to be regulated (the overinclusiveness inquiry); and (2) the amount of the burden on
individuals who are properly regulated by the statute (the oppressiveness or restrictiveness in-
quiry)." Id, at 1281. Again, though under a "pristine" analysis the Court probably should con-
sider only the overinclusiveness inquiry under equal protection analysis, and reserve the restric-
tiveness inquiry for due process analysis, the Court has not disciplined its analysis in this way
either. See id at 1293 n.52. As noted there:
In theory, a statute which is neither underinclusive nor overinclusive, but which only
minimally serves the government's interest, or greatly burdens individuals, does not deny
a citizen equal protection of the laws, because the law is applied equally to all similarly
situated parties. It may, however, deny the citizen substantive due process if the burden
on the individual is sufficiently great compared to the minimal benefit that is achieved.
Id.
16 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 529 ("Under rational basis review a law will be upheld if it is
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose .... The means chosen only need be a
rational way to accomplish the end."); Kelso, supra note 11, at 1283 ("Regarding the question of
legislative fit and the various versions of rational review, minimum rationality review only re-
quires a minimally rational relationship... advancing a legitimate interest, and no less restric-
tive alternative analysis.").
17 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 529 ("Under intermediate scrutiny, a law is upheld if it is
substantially related to an important government purpose .... The means used need not be
necessary, but must have a 'substantial relationship' to the end being sought."); Kelso, supra
note 11, at 1300 ("[R]eflecting intermediate scrutiny's typical 'substantial' level of rigor, the
statute only need be 'narrowly drawn'-that is not 'subslantially more burdensome' than neces-
sary ....").
S CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 529 ("Under strict scrutiny a law is upheld if it is proven
necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. The government... must show that it
cannot achieve its objective through any less discriminatory alternative."); Kelso, supra note 11,
at 1283 n.19 ("At strict scrutiny, the Court applies the compelling governmental interest, direct
relationship, and least restrictive alternative legislative fit test.").
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to defer to legislative judgment, in which case rational review is em-
ployed, 9 or counsel the Court to be suspicious of the legislative ac-
tion, in which case some form of heightened scrutiny is applied .
Over time, the Court has clarified the standard of review to be ap-
plied in most cases under the Equal Protection Clause and related
constitutional doctrines, so that lower courts today are supplied with
reasonably clear and predictable guidance on what standard of review
to apply in most cases.
"9 Some of these factors include: (1) whether arguments of test, structure, and history sug-
gest that the classification is one the Framers and ratifiers would not have thought deserve
heightened scrutiny, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) ("The Court is most vul-
nerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law hav-
ing little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution."); (2) whether
judges are competent to make the substantive decisions required at heightened scrutiny, which
typically involve second-guessing legislative judgment, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985) ("Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive judg-
ments about legislative decisions, and we doubt that the predicate for such judicial oversight is
present where the classification deals with mental retardation."); and (3) whether a Pandora's
box would be opened up where heightened scrutiny in this case would lead to demands for
heightened scrutiny in other similarly situated cases. I at 445-46 ("[If the large and amor-
phous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect... it would be difficult to find
a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups .... One need mention in this respect
only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm.").
* Some of these factors include: (1) whether a fundamental right is involved, see Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race .... We advert to [these matters] merely in emphasis of our
view that strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential.
2..'); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("There may be nar-
rower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments .... "); (2) whether a deficiency exists in the "political processes which can ordi-
narily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation," id., including cases where
the legislature may be operating in a self-interested capacity, see infra note 34; (3) whether the
statute is "directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities," or reflects "preju-
dice against discrete and insular minorities," Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations
omitted); (4) whether the classification burdens an immutable characteristic, see Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) ("[S]ex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth ... ."); (5) whether the classification is
a product of stereotypical generalizations, particularly if part of an historical pattern of dis-
crimination, i&. at 684-85 ("There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfor-
tunate history of sex discrimination .... [Olur statute books gradually became laden with
gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes .... ."); and (6) whether the classification bur-
dens an individual for something not the product of that individual's choice, see Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) ("[I]mposing disabilities on the ... child is contrary to the basic con-
cept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrongdoing." (alteration in original) (citing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164,
175 (1972))).
21 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 525-636; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, at 638-
1023. For a discussion of how general principles can become more definite over time through
the common law process ofjudicial decision, see Charles Fried, TheArtifcial Reason of the Law or.
What Lanyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REv. 35, 38-49 (1981). For a discussion of how the Framers' and
ratifiers' views regarding constitutional interpretation were grounded in the grand traditions of
the Anglo-American common law system, see R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion and the Four Main Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL.
Jan. 2002]
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B. Implicit Standards of Review
While these three standards are clearly identified in modem Su-
preme Court doctrine, three other standards have been used in re-
cent cases, and a fourth additional standard has recently emerged.
These standards reflect variations on the three inquiries of govern-
mental interests, relationship to benefits, and burdens.
1. Heightened Rational Review Standards
Two of these additional standards of review reflect variations of
minimum rationality review. As noted above, to be constitutional
under minimum rationality review, the legislation must: (1) advance
legitimate governmental interests; (2) be rationally related to advanc-
ing those interests, and (3) not impose irrational burdens on indi-
viduals.2 Under minimum rationality review, the Court defers to lel-
islative judgment concerning both the statutory means and ends.
Thus, the Court will strike down the governmental action as unconsti-
tutional only if the challenger can nevertheless prove, given this def-
erence, that there is no conceivable legitimate interest to support the
24 tastatute, or that the statute's means to advance the governmentalends are clearly irrational.5
U. L. REV. 121, 164 (1994) ("This approach, which rejects non-interpretive review, favors such
principles as reasoned elaboration of the law, fidelity to precedent, deciding cases on narrower
grounds where possible, and deciding most cases only after full briefing and argument."); Cath-
erine Kemp, Habermas Among the Americans: Some Reflections on the Common Law, 76 DEN. U. L.
REV. 961 (1999). Kemp notes:
In Constitutional Fate, Philip Bobbitt elaborates a theory of the Constitution which sug-
gests that the legitimacy of certain conventional types of arguments is antecedent to,
rather than founded upon, a theory of the Constitution .... Bobbitt's answer is that the
initial forms of constitutional argument have their origin in decisions made by the Fram-
ers, decisions which in effect made the state a subject matter for the common law ....
These common law forms-conventions-are the source of the forms of constitutional
argument.
Id at 971. See also R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Swing Votes on the Current Supreme Court:
The Joint Opinion in Casey and Its Progeny 5-17 (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law) (discussing the Court's application of the
.common law" approach in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844-69 (1992), to "rea-
soned elaboration" of the law and the weight to be given to "precedent" in constitutional cases);
Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adju-
dication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973) (discussing a common law method of constitutional interpreta-
tion, and addressing whether Roe v. Wadewas rightly decided).
See supra text accompanying note 16.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 533-35, 541-43 (discussing the Court's deference to leg-
islative judgment under minimum rationality review, and noting that "the Supreme Court is
extremely deferential under the rational basis test and usually will find that laws are reason-
able"); Kelso, supra note 2, at 499 (recognizing that deferring "to the legislature's judgment
concerning whether a rational relation exists to a legitimate governmental end" is a "salient fea-
ture" of minimum rationality).
2' See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (declaring animus towards individuals
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In some cases, however, what has been called "second-order" ra-
tional review appears to exist.2 Under this version, the Court does
not defer to legislative judgment concerning means and ends, but
rather engages in a real inquiry into whether given the benefits of the
statute, the statute reflects a rational accommodation of interests.27
As discussed in previous articles, this standard seems to exist not only
in some cases under the Equal Protection Clause,28 but also in some
based solely upon their sexual orientation an illegitimate governmental interest); Cleburne Liv-
ing Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. at 448 ("Private biases [against the mentally retarded] may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." (quoting Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984))).
Se; eg., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993) ("A statutory classification fails rational
basis review only when it 'rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's
objective.'" (quoting Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978))). Compare Alle-
gheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989) (holding that county tax
assessor's practice of valuing real property at fifty percent of its most recent sale price, no mat-
ter when that most recent sale occurred, was irrational) with Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1
(1992) (holding that California Proposition 13, which limits real property taxes to one percent
of assessed valuation as of 1975-76 and permits reassessment only when sold, was rationally re-
lated to the conceivable legitimate purposes of allowing people to know their tax burden at
time of purchase, avoiding taxes on appreciation due to inflation, and encouraging stable
neighborhoods by creating an economic disincentive to move).
During his commentary to Panel II of the Symposium, Clint Bolick, of the Institute for
Justice, Washington, D.C., cited four cases he had litigated where the challenger was able to
prevail under minimum rationality review: Brown v. Barry, 710 F. Supp. 352 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(employing the rational basis test in finding a regulation forbidding shoeshine stands in public
places unconstitutional); Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (finding
certain provisions of the Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act violated the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment because the provisions were
not rationally related); Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (holding
that California state cosmetology licensing requirements were a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process Clauses under a rational basis test because the objectives were not ration-
ally related to the objectives); and Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994)
(striking down Houston's regulation ofjitneys, small motor vehicles used to carry passengers for
a fare, using a rational basis test). See Clint Bolick, Commentary at the University of Pennsylva-
niaJournal of Constitutional Law Symposium: Equal Protection After the Rational Basis Era
(Feb. 2-3, 2001) (videotape on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional
Law).
2' See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 536 ("Many argue that the Court in these cases ap-
plied a different, more rigorous version of the rational basis test."); Kelso, supra note 3, at 3 n.13
and sources cited therein (discussing "second-order" or "not toothless" rational review).
" See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 531, 536, stating:
The claim is that in some cases where the Court says that it is using rational basis review,
it is actually employing a test with more 'bite' than the customarily very deferential ra-
tional basis review .... The claim is that there is not a singular rational basis test but one
that varies between complete deference and substantial rigor.
See also Kelso, supra note 3, at 3-4 ("[T]he Court does not give special deference to the legisla-
ture's judgment, but rather balances for itself the relevant costs and benefits of the governmen-
tal program to ensure that the balance is sufficiently rational and does not reflect an excessive
burden on the individual.").
' See Kelso, supra note 2, at 521-23, 522 n.152 (citing, inter alia, City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S.
612 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973)). See also CHEMIERINSKY, supra note 4, at 535-36 (citing, inter alia, Metropolitan
Jan. 2002]
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cases involving substantive due process analysis,2 Dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis, ° Contract Clause analysis,3' and procedural
due process analysis.2  That each of these areas of constitutional
analysis should have a similar doctrinal structure should not be sur-
prising. In every case where the Court has to consider whether a
statute unconstitutionally infringes on an individual right, the Court
must consider whether the statute's means, in terms of both benefits
and burdens, justify the government's ends.3 Given these considera-
tions, the Court is naturally drawn to phrasing the doctrine as a three-
part test, focusing on governmental ends, the statute's relationship to
achieving benefits, and the statute's burden on individuals.
34
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985)).
' See Kelso, supra note 2, at 527-28 (citing, inter alia, United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry,
413 U.S. 508 (1973)). Many of these equal protection and substantive due process cases are
discussed more fully in Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court ftom
the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REv. 357 (1999).
O See Kelso, supra note 2, at 503-04, 519-20 (discussing, inter alia, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985), where the Court stated:
Under Commerce Clause analysis, the State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against
the burden the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the equal protection
context, however, if a State's purpose is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as
long as the burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a rela-
tionship that is not difficult to establish.
Id. at 881 n.128. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (holding
regulations banning retail sale of milk in plastic non-returnable, non-refillable containers was
not an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970) (finding a requirement that cantaloupes grown in Arizona must be packaged in Arizona
burdens interstate commerce and is therefore unconstitutional).
" See Kelso, supra note 2, at 501-02, 520-21 (discussing, inter alia, Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton,
462 U.S. 176, 191-92 & n.13 (1983) ("sharply" distinguishing regular deferential Contract
Clause analysis where the legislature imposes "a generally applicable rule of conduct" from
those cases involving "the special concerns associated with a State's impairment of its own con-
tractual obligations"); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,
412-13 n.14 (1983) (finding deference to the legislature inappropriate when the state is a con-
tracting party); United States Trust Co. v. NewJersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1977) (finding defer-
ence to the legislature inappropriate because of the state's interest in the contract)).
2 See Kelso, supra note 2, at 525-27 (discussing, inter alia, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976) (employing a tripartite balancing test to find that a due process right to a trial existed
before termination of Social Security disability benefits)). On Dormant Commerce Clause,
Contract Clause, and procedural due process examples, see Kelso, supra note 2, at 585 app. a,
tbl.1.
" The only exception to this principle would be for "absolute" rights where no balancing of
governmental interests versus individual interests need be done. Most constitutional rights are
not of this kind. But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting Bills of Attainder); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII (abolishing slavery).
For example, the three-part procedural due process test in Mathews v. Eldridge explicitly
considers: (1) "the private interest" that will be burdened; (2) the means by which the existing
procedures achieve the government's ends, including "the risk of an erroneous deprivation...
through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest" or ends in the case. Mathews, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976). Under Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, as phrased in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., the Court considers: (1) the State's "legitimate local public interest"; (2) the means by
which the statute achieves these ends, including whether the benefits of the statute "could be
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In some cases, a "third-order" rational review is also used by the
Court. Unlike minimum rationality review and "second-order" ra-
tional review, where the challenger has the burden to prove that the
statute is unconstitutional, in these cases the burden shifts to the gov-
ernment to prove that the governmental action is constitutional. 5
This shifting of the burden of proof to the government represents a
higher standard of review because of the increased difficulty for the
56government to prevail in these cases.
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities"; and (3) given these considera-
dons, whether the "burden" on interstate commerce is "clearly excessive" given the statute's
benefits. Pike, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Cases under the Contract Clause have a similar struc-
ture. In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, the Court balanced: (1) the state's "legitimate" in-
terest; (2) the statute's means, including whether the benefits of the statute could be served
"equally well" by an "evident and more moderate course"; and (3) given these considerations,
whether the "burdens" on contract rights are "reasonable" and "necessary" given the statute's
benefits. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. 1, 22,31 (1977).
These cases all involve a "second-order" kind of rational review, not minimum rationality
review, because the Court does not defer to the legislature's judgment in these cases, but rather
balances for itself the "reasonableness" of the statute's costs and benefits. Deference is not
given where the Court is dealing with state legislatures altering their own contracts, as in United
States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 7; or where state legislatures burden interstate commerce perhaps
for parochial state reasons, as discussed in Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protec-
tionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986); or where
governments deprive individuals of liberty or property rights, as in the procedural due process
cases. See generally Kelso, supra note 2, at 525-27. When the Court deals with a state legislature
altering general contract rights, and thus not acting in a self-interested manner, the Court ap-
plies minimum rationality review deference. See id. at 501-02, 520-21 (discussing United States
Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22-23 ("As is customary in reviewing economic and social regulation...
courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particu-
lar measure. When a State impairs the obligation of its own contract, the reserved-powers doc-
trine has a different basis." (citations omitted))). It should be noted that although the Court
does not give the standard minimum rationality review deference to legislative judgment in
these cases, and thus these cases involve a "not toothless" or "substantially rigorous" kind of ra-
tional review analysis, see supra, notes 26-27, the Court will still give some deference to govern-
mental judgment in these cases. On this point, see infra, note 94.
See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (finding the burden to be on the government
where Maine statute prohibiting importation of live baitfish discriminated against interstate
commerce); Kelso, supra note 2, at 501, 520 (discussing, inter alia, Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378 (1987) (where "the burden shifted to the government to prove no unconstitutional
action once a prima fade case had been shown")); Kelso, supra note 2, at 519-20 (explaining
that where a statute directly discriminates against interstate commerce, the burden shifts to the
government to justify the restriction); Kelso, supra note 3, at 12-15 (commenting on the Takings
Clause case Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), which employed a higher level of re-
view than minimum rationality). See generally Kelso, supra note 2, at 585 app. a, tbl.1. As with
the other cases involving individual rights, the structure of these doctrines reflects the same
three-part analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 11-18, 34. Thus, in Rankin v. MacPherson,
the Court balanced: (1) the government's "legitimate" ends; (2) the means by which the gov-
ernment action achieved these benefits, including whether the ends could be promoted
through less drastic action; and (3) given these considerations, whether the government can
show that the "burden" on the individual's First Amendment rights was "outweighed" by the
government's benefits. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388-92.
' Some persons might argue that the determination of who has the burden of proof is a
separate question from the standard of review. However, because burdens of proof are critical
in litigation, from a pragmatic standpoint it seems appropriate to recognize that a shifting bur-
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2. Levels of Review Between Intermediate and Strict Scrutiny
The remaining two additional levels of review that have appeared
in recent cases represent variations of scrutiny between intermediate
and strict scrutiny. As noted earlier, under intermediate review, the
legislation must: (1) advance important or substantial government
interests; (2) be substantially related to advancing those interests; and
(3) not be substantially more burdensome than necessary to advance
this interests.37 Strict scrutiny requires an increased level of scrutiny
for each of these three questions. Under strict scrutiny, the statute
must: (1) advance compelling governmental interests; (2) be directly
related to advancing those interests; and (3) be the least restrictive
effective means of doing so.38
The first additional level of scrutiny continues the intermediate
level of scrutiny for elements one and three of the heightened scru-
tiny tests; it, however, increases the level of scrutiny under the second
prong from the intermediate level of substantial relationship to the
strict scrutiny level of direct relationship. This is the test used to de-
termine the constitutionality of regulations of commercial speech. As
the Court stated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service
Commission, "[W] e ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial .... [Next] we must determine whether the regulation di-
rectly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is
not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." 9 Because
den of proof does change the rigor of the review in any case to which that shifting burden is
applied. In her commentary to Panel I of the Symposium, Kathryn Kolbert of the Annenberg
School for Communication, who has litigated a number of constitutional cases, including
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), emphasized the same point regarding the im-
portance in litigation of who has the burden of proof. See Kathryn Kolbert, Commentary at the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law Symposium: Equal Protection After
the Rational Basis Era (Feb. 2-3, 2001) (videotape on file with the University of PennsylvaniaJour-
nal of Constitutional Law).
n See supra note 17 and accompanying text. In its phrasing of intermediate review, the
Court has used the phrase "narrowly drawn" to reflect both the substantial relationship and the
not substantially more burdensome than necessary elements of intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (requiring a "'fit' between the legislature's ends and
the means chosen to accomplish those ends.., that employs not necessarily the least restrictive
means but... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective" (citations omitted)).
3 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. In its phrasing of strict scrutiny, the Court has
used the terms "narrowly drawn" or "necessary" to reflect the fact that at strict scrutiny the stat-
ute must directly advance its ends and be the least restrictive means of doing so. See United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166-67 (1987); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). For
a discussion of the idea that the phrase "precisely tailored" would be a better term and would
more clearly separate strict scrutiny from intermediate review, see infra note 46.
" Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). The
Central Hudson test for commercial speech as an example of this kind of heightened intermedi-
ate scrutiny was discussed in previous works. See Kelso, supra note 2, at 577-78; Kelso, supra note
3, at 20-31; Kelso, supra note 11, at 1294-95.
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it adds only one strict scrutiny component (direct relationship) to an
otherwise intermediate test, in previous articles I have called this level
of scrutiny intermediate or mid-level review with bite.0
A second possible level of scrutiny adopts the strict scrutiny re-
quirement for both elements one and two, but continues the inter-
mediate level of scrutiny for element three. Because this level adopts
two of the three levels of strict scrutiny, but dilutes element three to
an intermediate level of inquiry, this additional level can be called
"watered-down" or "loose" strict scrutiny. The most recent use of this
standard of review occurred in the equal protection case of Bush v.
Vera. In that case, though generally applying a strict scrutiny com-
pelling governmental interest analysis to a case of race discrimina-
tion, the majority, per Justice O'Connor, "reject[ed], as impossibly
stringent, the District Court's view of the narrow tailoring require-
ment, that 'a district must have the least possible amount of irregular-
ity in shape, making allowances for traditional districting criteria.'
42
Instead, the Court adopted the intermediate prong three require-
ment, only that the racial redistricting not be "substantially more
[burdensome] than is 'reasonably necessary."'4 3
This development is good for purposes of predictable and princi-
pled application of the law regarding standards of review. The addi-
tion of loose strict scrutiny creates four clearly defined levels of
heightened scrutiny, each one more rigorous than the preceding
standard of review on only one element of the three-pronged stan-
dard of review test." These levels of scrutiny thus provide a step-
SeeKelso, supra note 2, at 505-06, 586 app. a, tbl.1; Kelso, supra note 3, at 4-5.
' 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
Id. at 977 (quoting Bush v. Vera, 861 F. Supp 1304,1343 (1996)).
*' Id. at 979. Two earlier Supreme Court cases also seemed to adopt this loose strict scrutiny
approach in the context of race-based affirmative action in the employment context. See Para-
dise v. United States, 480 U.S. 149, 184 (1987) (plurality opinion) (stating that despite a strict
scrutiny approach, the affirmative action remedial plan was not required to satisfy the least re-
strictive alternative test); Fullilove v. KIutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 49092 (1980) (Burger, CJ.,joined
by white & Powell, J]., concurring) (refraining from adopting a rigorous strict scrutiny ap-
proach). However, in a majority opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, the Court clearly
adopted traditional rigorous strict scrutiny for race-based affirmative action. See Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235-39 (1995), cert. granted sub noa. Adarand v. Mineta, 121
S. Ct. 1401 (2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 122 S. Ct. 511 (2001). The Adarand
opinion followed Justice O'Connor's dissent in Paradise where she criticized the Paradise plural-
ity for not adopting traditional rigorous strict scrutiny in a race-based affirmative action case.
Paradise 480 U.S. at 199 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[To survive strict scrutiny, the District
Court order must fit with greater precision than any alternative remedy."). Despite this criti-
cism of "loose" strict scrutiny in Paradise and Adarand, the adoption by Justice O'Connor of
"loose" strict scrutiny in her majority opinion in Bush v. Vera suggests that this standard of re-
view has become part of moder Supreme Court doctrine, at least for racial redistricting cases.
" Thus, there is basic intermediate or mid-level review (with all three elements of the stan-
dard of review reflecting an intermediate approach towards the governmental interests, rela-
tionship, and burden inquiries); intermediate or mid-level review with bite (two elements in-
termediate, the relationship element strict scrutiny); loose strict scrutiny (two elements strict
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ladder approach towards standards of review, with each higher level
of scrutiny clearly more rigorous than the preceding level. Each level
of scrutiny is clearly defined in terms of doctrinal inquiries that have
been discussed in many prior cases. These levels thus provide pre-
dictability, along with flexibility, which should be the Supreme
Court's goal in developing an approach towards standards of review."
Further, because each level is composed of elements which are used
in many cases, there are plenty of precedents available on how to ap-




This analysis indicates that in terms of actual case results, there
are seven levels of scrutiny overall. These seven levels include a base
level of minimum rationality review, and then six levels of scrutiny
above that: two heightened rational review levels; two intermediate
levels; and two levels of strict scrutiny.
All of these levels reflect increased scrutiny of the three basic
questions asked in any inquiry into the constitutionality of legislation.
scrutiny, only the burden inquiry intermediate); and traditional strict scrutiny (all three ele-
ments strict). See generally infra Appendix.
See Kelso, supra note 2, at 513-16 (discussing the importance of predictability, but flexibil-
ity, in developing constitutional doctrines, and responding to possible concerns about the sug-
gestion, restated here, that in fact similar standards of review are used by the Supreme Court in
Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, First Amendment, Dormant Commerce Clause,
Takings Clause, and other individual rights doctrines). Of particular concern is that "such an
attempt [to propose a uniform approach to these various doctrines] may rob the affected doc-
trines of their needed flexibility or may impose a linguistic uniformity which is not helpful to
careful consideration of the various problems before the court." Kelso, supra note 2, at 513.
" For example, although few cases currently have applied "loose strict scrutiny," there are
plenty of strict scrutiny cases discussing "compelling" governmental interests and what a "direct"
relationship entails, and plenty of intermediate review cases examining what the "not substan-
tially more burdensome than necessary" test requires. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying
text.
To provide the maximum amount of clarity, it would be best if the Supreme Court used
different terms to reflect the different levels of rigor under the intermediate and strict scrutiny
.narrowly drawn" tests. For example, sometimes the Supreme Court uses the phrase "narrowly
drawn" to reflect the fact that at strict scrutiny the statute must directly advance its ends and be
the least restrictive means of doing so. See Kelso, supra note 2, at 507 n.64. However, the Court
has also used the phrase "narrowly drawn" to reflect the intermediate "not substantially more
burdensome than necessary" approach. Id at 506-07 (citing Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
480 (1989)). To reflect the rigor of traditional strict scrutiny, and to separate this approach
from the more flexible "substantially" narrowly drawn analysis-now used at intermediate re-
view, intermediate review with bite, and loose strict scrutin)--the term "precisely tailored" is a
better term to use than "narrowly tailored" for the strict scrutiny "least restrictive alternative"
test. See Kelso, supra note 2, at 507 n.64. Adoption of the term "precisely tailored" is consistent
with the Supreme Court's use of this phrase on occasion. See id at 506 n.62 (noting the Court
phrases the strict scrutiny test in terms of whether the regulation is "precisely tailored to serve
[a] compelling state interest" (quoting Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 666 (1990))).
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At rational review, the increased scrutiny comes from an increasing
lack of deference to the legislature when applying the rational review
test. At higher levels of scrutiny, the increased rigor comes from
gradually adding to intermediate review elements of a strict scrutiny
approach on the inquiries of governmental ends, relationship to
benefits, and burdens. This structure is summarized in a table that
appears in Appendix A.
II. POSSIBLE PROBLEMS WITH FUTURE PROLIFERATION
OF SCRUTINY LEVELS
Given this understanding of the Court's current practice employ-
ing seven levels of scrutiny in assessing the constitutionality of gov-
ernmental action, a danger of increased confusion and unpredictabil-
ity exists if proliferation of levels continues. This could happen if:
(1) The Court adopts additional kinds of inquiries different than
the three basic inquiries used under the three basic levels of scrutiny;
or
(2) Additional mixing and matching of different kinds of scrutiny
occurs for the governmental interests, relationship to benefits, and
burden inquiries; or
(3) The "base plus six" standards are not clearly acknowledged.
Unfortunately, each of these concerns are real given language in
some recent equal protection and related Supreme Court cases.
A. The Problem of Additional Kinds of Inquiries
Two recent cases underscore the kind of problem created by the
possible proliferation of additional kinds of inquiries. First, in the
context of reviewing the constitutionality of a court injunction, the
Court in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. adopted an analysis un-
der element three of heightened scrutiny that was described as being
somewhere between the intermediate "not substantially more bur-
densome" test and the strict scrutiny "least restrictive alternative"
test.47 From the opinion, it is not clear exactly how much more strin-
gent this test is than traditional intermediate scrutiny, nor are other
precedents of any help, since the standard is not used in any other
case. As the dissent noted in Madsen, "The Court... creates, brand
new... an additional standard .... The difference between it and
intermediate scrutiny.., is frankly too subtle for me to de-
" 512 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1994) (stating that where basic intermediate review requires that
the restriction be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest," the new stan-
dard requires that the restriction "burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant
government interest").
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scribe .... ,,48 As discussed later,49 this additional version of the nar-
rowly drawn analysis is unnecessary under the "base plus six" model
of scrutiny discussed in this Article. This is true even if one agrees
that higher scrutiny is appropriate for court injunctions rather than
for other kinds of governmental action, as the majority held in Mad-
50sen.
The eqcual protection, gender discrimination case of United States
v. Virginia" is another case of increased proliferation of inquiries
leading to a confused result. Although Justice Ginsburg's majority
opinion initially cited standard intermediate review as the appropri-
ate standard to apply in a gender discrimination case,' the opinion
ultimately seemed to require that the State of Virginia show an "ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification" for its gender discrimination at the
Virginia Military Institute (VMI), not merely a substantial relationship
to important government interests.53 As Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted in his concurring opinion, adoption of the phrase "exceedingly
persuasive justification... introduces an element of uncertainty" and
"potential confusion" into the appropriate test and is unnecessary to
strike down the gender discrimination at issue at VMI.5 As discussed
later, if the Court wants to adopt a higher level of scrutiny for gender
discrimination cases than traditional intermediate review, it would be
preferable to adopt one of the heightened standards under the "base
plus six" model-intermediate review with bite, loose strict scrutiny,
or strict scrutiny-rather than add another uncertain standard of re-
view-exceedingly persuasive analysis-into the mix.
5
Id at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining the Court's
expanded use of levels of scrutiny).
"9 See infra text accompanying notes 100-05 (discussing the proper response to the problem
of proliferation).
'0 512 U.S. at 765-66 (distinguishing ordinances from court-imposed injunctions, and noting
that "these differences require a somewhat more stringent application of general First Amend-
ment principles" for injunctions).
, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
Id. at 533 ("The State must show 'at least that the [challenged] classification serves impor-
tant governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially re-
lated to the achievement of those objectives.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724 (1982))).
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996).
Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
See infra text accompanying notes 106-07. On the uncertainty caused by the Court's opin-
ion in United States v. Virginia, see generally Jason M. Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative
Action Under United States v. Virginia's "Exceedingly Persuasive Justification" Standard, 86 CAL L.
REV. 1169 (1998). During his commentary to Panel IV at the Symposium, Professor Lawrence
Sager of the New York University School of Law suggested that perhaps Justice Ginsburg's use
of the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification" was an attempt to move outside the current
levels of scrutiny analysis, in beginning to reassess whether the current scheme makes contin-
ued sense. See Professor Lawrence Sager, Commentary at the University of PennsylvaniaJournal
of Constitutional Law Symposium: Equal Protection After the Rational Basis Era (Feb. 2-3,
2001) (videotape on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law).
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B. Problems of Mixing and Matching Levels of Scrutiny
1. Rational Review and Intermediate Mixing and Matching
In addition to the three versions of rational review discussed ear-
lier in this Article,56 it would be possible for the Court to add levels of
review mixing rational review and intermediate review. For example,
the Court could suggest that the government action must have a ra-
tional relationship to an important or substantial government inter-
est. The Court appears to have done this in a voting rights case,
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party.7 The Court could also suggest
that the government action must have a substantial relationship to a
legitimate government interest. The Court appears to have done this
in the Takings Clause case of City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,8 rely-
ing in part on Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.59
Each of these decisions is troublesome. In addition to creating
additional levels of review without demonstrating need for them,
these cases violate the certainty gained under the "base plus six"
model of knowing that each different level of review represents a
step-ladder increase in the rigor of scrutiny over the previous level.' °
For example, which level of scrutiny is more rigorous-the Timmons
rational relationship to important government interest test, the Nol-
lan/Del Monte Dunes substantial relationship to legitimate government
interest test, or the related Takings Clause case of Dolan v. City of Ti-
gard's "rough proportionality" standard?61 Presumably Dolan is more
Whether or not that was her intent, it is unlikely that a majority of the current Court shares an
instinct to rethink levels of scrutiny analysis in any major way. See generally infra notes 72-75 and
accompanying text.
" See supra text accompanying notes 22-36.
" 520 U.S. 351, 358, 369-70 (1997) ("[A] State's 'important regulatory interests' will usually
be enough to justify 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions'.... [T]he burdens Minne-
sota's fusion ban imposes on the New Party's associational rights are justified by 'correspond-
ingly weighty' valid state interests in ballot integrity and political stability." (citations omitted)).
58 526 U.S. 687 (1999). The Court stated:
[A]lthough this Court has provided neither a definitive statement of the elements of a
claim for a temporary regulatory taking nor a thorough explanation of the nature or ap-
plicability of the requirement that a regulation substantially advance legitimate public in-
terests outside the context of required dedications or exactions... [g]iven the posture
of the case before us, we decline the suggestions of amid to revisit these precedents.
Id. at 704 (citations omitted).
Id. (citing 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 n.3 (1987)).
See supra text accompanying notes 44-46 and infra Appendix.
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,391 (1994) (arguing that the "rough proportion-
ality" standard is a different, and more vigorous, level of scrutiny than "the term 'rational basis'
which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.. . ."); see also
Kelso, supra note 3, at 12-15 (discussing the Court's usage of heightened rational review scrutiny
in Dolan v. City of Tigard).
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rigorous than Nollan/Del Monte Dunes,62 but that is not certain under
the Court's current formulations.63 Recasting Timmons and Nollan/Del
Monte Dunes as versions of minimum rationality review or second-
order rational review," while acknowledging Dolan as third-order ra-
tional review, since the government clearly bears the burden of dem-
onstrating the constitutionality of its action in Dolan,ss would clarify
this aspect of the law considerably.
2. Intermediate and Strict Scrutiny Mixing and Matching
As a theoretical matter, the Court could also adopt levels of scru-
tiny between traditional intermediate and traditional strict scrutiny in
addition to the intermediate with bite and loose strict scrutiny stan-
dards discussed earlier.6 For example, the Court could require, as a
version of intermediate review with bite, the government to have a
compelling government interest to regulate, but only require a sub-
stantial relationship between means and ends and require that the
action not substantively burden more persons than necessary. Alter-
natively, as a version of loose strict scrutiny, the Court could require
compelling government interests, a least restrictive alternative test, by
requiring only a substantial relationship, rather than a direct rela-
tionship, between means and ends.
Adoption of such tests, however, would only add uncertainty to
the law in terms of rigor in the standards of review. Which version of
intermediate review with bite is more rigorous-the current Central
Hudson test (which adds to basic intermediate review only the strict
scrutiny direct relationship requirement),67 or the version suggested
above (which adds to basic intermediate scrutiny only the strict scru-
tiny compelling government interest test)? Which version of loose
strict scrutiny is more rigorous-Bush v. Vera (which only waters down
See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 704-05 (declining, in a regulatory takings case, to apply the
Dolan analysis outside the Dolan context of required dedications or exactions).
" For example, it is not clear from the ordinary meaning of words that the "substantial rela-
tionship" required in Nollan is less rigorous than the "reasonable proportionality" of Dolan.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 108-21. Neither Timmons nor Nollan/Del Monte Dunes
represent third-order rational review, since in each case the challenger appears to bear the
burden of proving that the government action is unconstitutional. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 365-
66 (focusing its analysis on the challenger's burden, with the Court speaking in terms of what
"[p]etitioners contend" and "petitioners urge"); Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 700-01 (noting
that jury instructions required the challenger to demonstrate that the government action was
unconstitutional).
See 512 U.S. at 388-91 (placing the burden on the municipality to show a reasonable rela-
tionship between the dedications and the municipality's needs for the land); id at 413 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for placing the burden on the government). For discus-
sion of Dolan as representing an example of third-order rational review, see Kelso, supra note 3,
at 12-15.
66 See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
" See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
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the least restrictive alternative requirement of strict scrutiny),' or the
version suggested above (which only waters down the direct relation-
ship requirement of strict scrutiny)? By having only one kind of in-
termediate review with bite and one kind of loose strict scrutiny, the
"base plus six" model preserves a system where in each succeeding
level of scrutiny is clearly more rigorous than the preceding level.
In the absence of any showing that more than seven levels of scrutiny
are needed to promote flexibility in decision making, the Court
should stick with those seven levels and not engage in any unneces-
sary and confusing additional proliferation in the levels of review."
Further, if seven levels are going to be used, the seven levels currently
used most frequently provide the soundest foundation on which to
base existing doctrine. Of course, the Court could choose to scrap
cs See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
"See supra text accompanying notes 44-46 and infraAppendix.
In her commentary to Panel III of the Symposium, Professor Deborah Hellman, of the
University of Maryland, noted that given the three basic inquiries of advancement (legitimate,
important, or compelling), relationship to benefits (rational, substantial, or direct) and bur-
dens (not irrationally burdensome, not substantially more burdensome than necessary, or the
least burdensome alternative), and the three levels of scrutiny for each inquiry, mathematically
there are twent -seven possible permutations of levels of scrutiny. See Professor Deborah Hell-
man, Commentary at the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law Symposium:
Equal Protection After the Rational Basis Era (Feb. 2-3, 2001) (videotape on file with the Univer-
sity of PennslvaniaJournal of Constitutional Law). With the addition of "substantial deference"
versus "no substantial deference" under the rational basis standard of review, and the opportu-
nity to place the burden on the challenger or the government, the number of possible permu-
tations rises to more than sixty-four. Practical reasonableness, however, a hallmark of the An-
glo-American common law, suggests that the Court should resist such a proliferation in possible
tests where there is no demonstrated need for such additional levels. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber,
The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533
(1992) (discussing the benefits of statutory interpretation through practical reason as opposed
to formalism); Fried, supra note 21, at 38-49 (discussing "the artificial reason of the law"); Harry
W.Jones, Our Uncommon Common Law, 42 TENN. L. REV. 443, 450-63 (1975) (discussing the ori-
gins and development of common law). Of course, this does not mean that the Court should
not adopt a variation within a level of review if institutional needs so counsel. See, e.g., Fiallo v.
Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (noting the extra level of deference under minimum rationality
review that is given to congressional regulations "over immigration and naturalization, [where]
'Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens'" (quoting
Mathews v. Dias, 426 U.S. 67,80 (1976))).
" Admittedly, in some respects the proposal in this Article that the Court should stick with
the "base plus six" model for seven levels of scrutiny is somewhat arbitrary. For example, this
article proposes that the two levels of heightened rational review should be "second-order" no
substantial deference and "third-order" burden shifts to the government. See infra Appendix.
Alternatively, similar to the two heightened review levels between intermediate review and strict
scrutiny, which increase the level of rigor on succeeding elements of the three basic inquiries of
advancement, relationship to benefits, and burdens, one could suggest that the two levels of
heightened rational review should be the substantially related to legitimate interests test of Del
Monte Dunes, see supra note 58, and then a substantially related to important government inter-
ests, but not irrationally burdensome, analysis; this is an approach not used in any current case.
The advantage of the approach proposed in this Article to heightened rational review is that it
builds on existing case-law, adopting levels of scrutiny that appear in numerous existing prece-
dents. See supra text accompanying notes 22-36. Only a few cases, therefore, like Del Monte
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the current levels of scrutiny, and adopt either a "sliding scale" ap-
proach72 or some new theory entirely separate from the current doc-
trinal approach.73  Practical considerations and historical experience
suggest such a move would be neither a good idea74 nor likely to be
adopted by a majority of the Court.7
C. Acknowledging the Six Standards of Heightened Review
In addition to these observations, it would help certainty and pre-
dictability in the law if the Court explicitly acknowledged the exis-
tence in current doctrine of the seven levels of scrutiny. Explicitly
acknowledging only the three basic levels-minimum rationality re-
Dunes or Timmons, require reconceptualization. See infra text accompanying notes 109-122. In
the absence of strong reasons to the contrary, the lessons of the common law support building
on existing precedent where possible. See, e.g.,Jones, supra note 70, at 450-63.
" See, e.g., Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Between the Tiers: The New(est) Equal Protection and Bush
v. Gore, 4 U. PA.J. CONsT. L. 372 (2002) (discussing with approval the "sliding scale" approach
touted byJustice Marshall in San Antonio v. Rodriguez and Justice Stevens in Craig v. Boren).
", See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Judicial Supremacy and Equal Protection in a Democracy of Right 4
U. PA.J. CONST. L. 281 (2002) (proposing a new theory of the Court's role in protecting indi-
vidual rights in which equal protection law contains no form of heightened scrutiny).
", See Kelso, supra note 2, at 517 (noting that "a sliding scale standard provides little guid-
ance for lower courts faced with resolving equal protection and due process cases and might
provide lower courts with too much discretion in applying the sliding scale standard"). This is
particularly true given the growth in the dockets of the lower federal courts, which makes it "es-
sentially impossible for the Court to engage in meaningful 'error correction.'" Ashutosh Bhag-
wat, Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the "Judicial
Power," 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 996 (2000). With regard to adopting a new theory of individual
rights, a suggestion often promoted by progressive constitutional theorists disappointed at the
current state of some doctrinal outcomes, John Hart Ely's caution of two decades ago is still
relevant. John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Val-
ues, 92 HARV. L. RE'V. 5, 17 (1978) ("[Tlhere is absolutely no assurance that the Supreme
Court's life-tenured members will be persons who share your values."). See also Mark A. Graber,
RethinkingEqual Protection in Dark Times, 4 U. PA.J. CONsT. L. 314, 318 (2002) ("Progressives are
likely to influence present constitutional meanings only by devising arguments that convince
some conservative officeholders to maintain what progressives perceive to be a very imperfect
status quo.").
7" The fact that versions of the standards of review appear in so many doctrines, see supra
notes 11-65 and accompanying text, suggests strong institutional support at the Supreme Court
for doctrine to be developed in that way. Further, unlike the experience in France during the
French Revolution, where much old doctrine was thrown out in favor of new doctrine devel-
oped by non-judicial actors and imposed through the Napoleonic Code, there are few examples
in our common law system of judges rejecting doctrines so well-developed and entrenched as
the standards of review. Perhaps the only similar example would be the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion in 1937 of the Lochner-era Court's approach to substantive due process and the Commerce
Clause. That rejection, however, was a product of the well-known constitutional conflict be-
tween President Roosevelt and the Court. See, e.g., RONALD ROTUNDA, MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 188-89 (6th ed. 2000) (discussing "The Court Packing
Plan of 1937"). No conflict of that magnitude is on the horizon today regarding the standards
of review under the Equal Protection Clause or any of the other constitutional doctrines where
versions of the standards of review are used, like due process, freedom of speech, Dormant
Commerce Clause, Contract Clause, or the Takings Clause.
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view, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny-while in fact adopt-
ing in individual cases a myriad of different formulations of review to
respond to the nuances of those individual situations, as discussed71
above, promotes neither certainty nor predictability in the law.
At rational review, this means acknowledging the roles that "sec-
ond-order" and "third-order" rational review play in constitutional
analysis. Instead of the possible implicit use of such review, as in the
cases discussed above,7 this would mean that the Court should
squarely face that in some cases, a real choice exists between whether
to apply minimum rationality review or either second-order or third-
order rational review; that choice should be faced directly. For ex-
ample, such a choice of whether to apply minimum rationality review
or second-order rational review may implicitly have been made in the
1985 equal protection case City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.78 In 1993, a five Justice majority ducked this issue in Heller v. Doe,
suggesting that only minimum rationality review exists. 79 A four Jus-
tice dissent supported the Cleburne kind of rational review.s° Given
the change in the membership of the Court since 1993, the dissent
may have five votes for its position today.8' If so, it would help if the
next opinion to address the issue was phrased in terms of Cleburne-
explicitly representing second-order rational review-with the ele-
ments of that standard of review used as defined herein.
Such an acknowledgment would not represent an additional pro-
liferation in the levels of review. Due to its skepticism of the legisla-
tive agenda, the Court does not currently defer to state legislative
judgments under Dormant Commerce Clause analysis or the Con-
tract Clause when the State is attempting to alter its own contractual
obligationsss Thus, this level of review already exists in the Court's
See supra text accompanying notes 11-65.
See supra text accompanying notes 26-36.
473 U.S. 432,449-50 (1985) (majority opinion phrased the question in terms of minimum
rationality review in dealing with the mentally impaired); id at 458-60 (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the majority
opinion actually applied "second-order" rational review). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1444 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that in Cleburne the Court did not
defer to the legislature's judgment concerning the rationality of the statute as is usual under
minimum rationality review, but rather determined for itself "whether the policies hypothesized
to save the challenged action were actually supported by fact...." (citations omitted)); Kelso,
supra note 2, at 499-500 (discussing Cleburne as a possible case of second-order rational review).
'7 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1993).
0Id. at 336-37 (Souter,J.,joined by Blackmun, Stevens, & O'ConnorJJ., dissenting).
"1 Three of the Heller dissenters, Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter, are still on the
Court today. The two most recent additions to the Court, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, would
likelyjoin them in a similar case today. However, in the interests of faithfulness to precedent, it
is not certain that all five would support the Heler dissent today. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett,
125 S. Ct. 955, 963 (2001) (Justice O'Connorjoining a five Justice majority opinion making ref-
erence to Cleburne adopting the "minimum 'rational basis' review").
"* See supra text accompanying notes 26-34.
'3 See supra note 34.
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individual rights jurisprudence. Such an acknowledgment in
Cleburne, or in another appropriate case,8 would exemplify the
Court's candidness in stating that based on the rationales for apply-
ing heightened scrutiny, the lack of deference routinely applied in
Dormant Commerce Clause cases and some Contract Clause cases is
also appropriate for the Equal Protection Clause case in question.8
A second area that would benefit from a candid acknowledgment
of second-order rational review includes cases involving less than un-
due burdens on unenumerated fundamental rights. For example,
the Court has applied strict scrutiny in cases involving significant
burdens on the fundamental right to marry, as in Zablocki v. RedhaiL
6
The Court has also applied strict scrutiny to significant burdens on
the right to travel in Shapiro v. Thompson5 7 and Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County88 However, in cases involving less than substantial
burdens on these unenumerated fundamental rights, the Court has
applied some version of rational review, but seemingly without the
usual deference to the legislative branch typical of minimum rational-
ity review.s9 Candid acknowledgment of this may also help explain
the higher than minimum rationality review seemingly given in an-
See, e.g., Brian B. ex rel Lois B. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., 230 F.3d 582, 587, 590 (3d
Cir. 2000) (applying minimum rationality review to hold there was no violation of equal protec-
tion where a Pennsylvania statute limited education to youths convicted as adults and incarcer-
ated in adult, county correctional facilities, but did not so limit education to youths incarcer-
ated in state facilities; dissent applied a Cleburne-like rational review because "isolation of this
particular group of school-age inmates awakens my skepticism"), cert. denied sub nom, Brian B. ex
rel. Louis B. v. Hickok, 121 S. Ct. 1603 (2001). Even incarcerated persons, of course, have con-
stitutional rights. See, e.g., Turner v. Safiley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that a ban on a pris-
oner's right to marry failed rational review as not reasonably related to any legitimate govern-
ment interest).
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding invalid a statute requiring court approval orders for mar-
riages of state residents who have child support obligations, on grounds that it violated the
Equal Protection Clause and the right to marry).
' 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding invalid a statute that denied welfare benefits to residents of
certain states who resided there for less than a year).
415 U.S. 250 (1974) (holding invalid a state requirement of a year's residence to receive
medical benefits).
' See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (finding restrictions on prisoners' ability to marry
not "reasonable"); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 407 (1985) (holding that Iowa may "reasonably"
decide to impose a residency requirement before individuals can obtain a divorce in the state).
On this issue of less than undue burdens on fundamental rights perhaps triggering "second-
order" rational review, rather than minimum rationality review, see generally Kelso, supra note
2, at 596-99. Of course, if the right to travel is reconceptualized as a privileges and immunities
issue, see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (striking down, under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, a California statute denying cash assistance to persons with less than a year's residence),
then perhaps those cases should be analyzed under intermediate review, as in the Art. IV, § 2,
cl. 1 privileges and immunities cases that adopt intermediate review. See Supreme Court of New
Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (striking down, under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, a New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule limiting bar admission to state residents). For
further discussion of Piper, see Kelso, supra note 2, at 505.
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other case of a less than substantial burden on an unenumerated
fundamental right, Hodgson v. Minnesota."
A third area in which acknowledgment of the variations of ra-
tional review would aid clarification of the law involves City ofBoerne v.
Flord' and Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. Col-
lege Savings Bank.92 In these cases, the Supreme Court required that
when Congress legislates pursuant to its Section 5 enforcement power
under the Fourteenth Amendment that "[t]here must be a congru-
ence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end."93 Given the level of
scrutiny in both cases concerning whether Congress had satisfied this
test, it is reasonably clear that these cases were not adopting the def-
erential minimum rational review level of scrutiny.' In both cases,
however, it is unclear whether the challenger or the government has
the burden of demonstrating whether "congruence and proportion-
ality" exist. Explicit acknowledgment of the seven standards of review
would raise the visibility of this question, and help clarify whether City
of Boerne and Florida Prepaid were adopting second-order or third-
order rational review.
95
9' 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (holding, in an abortion rights case dealing with parental notifica-
don, that ajudicial bypass was constitutionally required). For further discussion, see Kelso, su-
pra note 2, at 529 n.196.
91 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as beyond the
power of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
" 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that Congress could not, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, abrogate a state's sovereign immunity to patent infringement cases).
Id. at 639 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20).
"See F~orida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640-44 (scrutinizing Congress' rationale for enacting the
Patent Remedy Act); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-34 (showing little deference for Congress' action
and rationale in passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). Despite this lack of minimum
rationality review deference, some deference to governmental judgment is given in these
heightened rational review cases. See, eg., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (Congress' "conclusions are
entitled to much deference"); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989) (asserting
that while the Turner v. Safley "reasonableness" standard for determining marriage rights of
prisoners "is not toothless," "[iln the volatile prison environment, it is essential that prison offi-
cials be given broad discretion to prevent.., disorder"); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349
(holding that under procedural due process analysis "substantial weight [will] be given to the
good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of...
programs"). See Kelso, supra note 2, at 526 n.177 for a further discussion of Mathews. On the
deference given generally to governmental judgment in these heightened rational review cases,
see also notes 26-27,34 and accompanying text.
" To the extent that the tvo cases themselves provide any guidance, they seem to point in
opposite directions. Boerne seems to suggest that the burden is on the challenger, as the Court
acknowledges the "broad" power of Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. On the other hand, Fkorida Prepaid seems to put the burden on Con-
gress to demonstrate congruence and proportionality. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639 ("[F]or
Congress to invoke § 5, it must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such
conduct."). The burden also seems to be placed on Congress in Board of Trustees of the University
of Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 964 (2001) ("Once we have determined the metes and
bounds of the constitutional right in question, we examine whether Congress identified a his-
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Explicit acknowledgment of the seven levels of scrutiny would also
help clarify various aspects of heightened scrutiny. For example, the
Court has struggled with the appropriate standard of review to apply
to various kinds of free speech cases: content-based versus content-
neutral regulations in both public and nonpublic forums; reasonable
time, place, and manner regulations; regulations of commercial
speech; regulations of television and radio versus cable television
regulations; court injunctions on free speech rights; and prior re-
straints on speech.96 Acknowledgment of the seven levels of scrutiny
might help sort out some of the Court's current confusion in cases
like court injunctions or cable television regulation.97
Acknowledgment of the seven levels of scrutiny would also help
explain the language in Bush v. Vera, which rejected a traditional
strict scrutiny approach,98 while not undermining traditional strict
scrutiny in areas like affirmative action in employment where the
Court intends traditional strict scrutiny to apply.
III. THE PROPER RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM OF PROLIFERATION
The proper response to each of the problems posed by the poten-
tial proliferation of levels of review discussed in Part II is to adopt the
"base plus six" model of review, and then to recast each of the trou-
blesome cases under that model. Given the flexibility inherent in the
"base plus six" model, this recasting is easy to do.
For example, as discussed earlier, in the context of reviewing the
constitutionality of a court injunction, the Court adopted in Madsen
v. Woman's Health Center, Inc. an analysis under element three of
heightened scrutiny that was described as being somewhere between
the intermediate "not substantially more burdensome" test and the
strict scrutiny "least restrictive alternative" test."° Such proliferation
of inquiries is unnecessary. It is understandable that the Court might
wish to adopt in Madsen a standard of review higher than traditional
intermediate scrutiny, which applies to a content-neutral regulation
of speech, because Madsen involves review of a court injunction
tory and pattern of unconstitutional ... discrimination by the States...."). Placing the burden
on the government would mean that the "congruence and proportionality" test tracks in rigor
the "rough proportionality" test of Dolan. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. For
further discussion of Boerne and its place in contemporary constitutional law, see Edward
McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Curious Chiasma: Rising and Falling Protection of Religious Freedom and Gen-
derEquality, 4 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 394 (2002).
See generally Kelso, supra note 2, at 557-82; Kelso, supra note 3, at 20-37.
See infra text accompanying notes 100-05; 122-29.
See Bush v. Vera, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (1996); supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
See supra note 43 (discussing Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), cert. granted sub nom.
Adarand v. Mineta, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 122 S. Ct. 511
(2001), and Paradise v. United States, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)).
512 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1994). See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
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rather than a generally applicable ordinance.'0 The "base plus six"
model gives the Court three well-formed options from which to
choose-intermediate with bite, loose strict scrutiny, or strict scrutiny.
The dissent in Madsen opted for strict scrutiny.10 2 The majority could
basically have achieved its same result by adopting intermediate re-
view with bite. As the majority's analysis reveals, where the injunction
at issue in Madsen was constitutional, it was because it was directly re-
lated to the perceived harms and was a close enough fit to satisfy the
intermediate "not substantially more burdensome than necessary"
test.03 Where the injunction was unconstitutional, it was because it
was not directly related to perceived harms," or not a close enough
fit, and thus substantially overbroad.10 Thus, in terms of predictable
and stable levels of scrutiny, it would be better if the majority recast
the increased scrutiny for court injunctions in Madsen as a case involv-
ing intermediate review with bite, rather than the new, unclear ver-
sion of the narrowly-drawn analysis that the majority actually adopted
in Madsen.
The gender discrimination case of United States v. Virginia, dis-
cussed earlier,06 is another case of unnecessary proliferation of in-
quiries leading to a confused result. If the Court wants to adopt a
higher level of scrutiny for gender discrimination cases than tradi-
tional intermediate scrutiny, it would be preferable to adopt one of
the heightened standards under the "base plus six" model-interme-
diate with bite, loose strict scrutiny, or strict scrutiny-rather than
add another uncertain standard of review-exceedingly persuasive
analysis-into the mix.'07
.0 512 U.S. at 764-66 (discussing the differences between ordinances and injunctions, and
concluding that "these differences require a somewhat more stringent application of general
First Amendment principles in this context").
10 i. at 792-94 (Scala,J., joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (asserting that "speech-restricting injunction[s]" should always be given strict scru-
tiny).
"3 I& at 767-70 (finding that a thirtysix foot buffer zone in front of an abortion clinic is di-
rectly related to protecting unfettered ingress and egress from the clinic, and a close enough fit
given the deference due to the state court's familiarity with the factual background); id. at 772-
73 (finding that regulation of noise levels is directly related to the need for noise control
around hospitals and medical facilities).
I0 Id. at 771 (finding that inclusion of thirty-six foot buffer zone at the back and side of the
clinic is not directly related to ingress and egress from clinic); id. at 773-74 (finding prohibition
on all uninvited approaches to persons seeking to enter the clinic not directly related to pre-
venting clinic patients from being stalked or shadowed).
"' Id. at 773 (holding that a ban on all images observable from the clinic is not narrowly
drawn given the substantially less burdensome option for the clinic to "pull its curtains"); id. at
774-75 (holding that a three hundred foot ban on picketing around the clinic was "much
larger" than the buffer zone found permissible in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988)).
518 U.S. 515 (1996). See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
107 Similarly, the Court should remain predictable about the determination of what govern-
mental interests are appropriate to consider in determining the constitutionality of legislation.
Under its usual approach over the last fifteen years, the Court has used any conceivable gov-
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A third case involving an unnecessary proliferation of levels of
scrutiny is Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party. In Timmons, both the
majority and the two dissenting opinions agreed that for "severe"
burdens on an individual's First Amendment associational rights, a
strict scrutiny standard is appropriate. '08 For less than severe burdens,
however, the majority did not adopt any traditional standard of re-
view.'09 As discussed earlier," ° the majority's reference to a reasonable
relationship to important government interests is confusing in terms
of the "base plus six" model. Since none of the opinions in Timmons
demonstrated the traditional minimum rationality review deference
to governmental decision making,"' the real choice that must have
been made in a case like Timmons was whether to adopt a version of
heightened rational review, either second-order or third-order, or to
adopt intermediate scrutiny.
Justice Souter's dissent in the case clearly opted for intermediate
scrutiny,"'' and thus has the advantage of clarity. By considering only
those interests put forward by the government in litigation, Justice
emnment interest to support a statute under rational review; it has considered any plausible gov-
ernmental interest asserted during the litigation under intermediate review; and it has consid-
ered only actual governmental purposes under strict scrutiny. See generally Kelso, supra note 3,
at 7-9; Kelso, supra note 2, at 530-36. To the extentJustice Ginsburg's opinion in United States v.
Virginia suggested that at intermediate review the Court will only consider actual governmental
interests, this was a departure from traditional analysis. See Vrrginia, 518 U.S. at 535-36.
The two cases cited by Justice Ginsburg in United States v. Virginia to support using an ac-
tual purpose analysis at intermediate scrutiny are over twenty years old, and do not clearly sup-
port that position. In the first case, Weinberger v. WiesenfeK while the Court did conduct an in-
quiry "into the actual purposes" underlying the statutory scheme, it indicated that this inquiry
was for the purpose of determining whether or not "the asserted purpose could not have been a
goal of the legislation." Thus, the focus of the case was on whether the asserted purpose was
'plausible," the typical intermediate scrutiny. Weinberger, 420 U.S. 636, 648 & n.16 (1975). In
the second case, Califano v. Goldfarb, Justice Ginsburg cited the four justice plurality opinion,
which seemed to adopt an actual purpose inquiry. See Califano, 430 U.S. 199, 212-13 (1977).
Justice Stevens's concurrence, however, which provided the critical fifth vote in the case,
phrased the test as whether the Court, faced with an interest "put forward by the Government as
its justification," id. at 223, "might presume that Congress had such an interest in mind." Id at
223 n.9 (StevensJ., concurring). Implausible post hocjustifications for a statute can only be used
under the any conceivable interest test of rational review. Under the Califano test, however, the
Court can evaluate plausible governmental interests put forward in litigation at intermediate
scrutiny because the Court can presume Congress had such an intent in mind.
' 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); id. at 374 (Stevens, J.,joined by Ginsburg & Souter,.fl., dissent-
ing); id. at 382-83 (SouterJ., dissenting).
'°' Id. at 358-59. On this issue of the amount of burden on a constitutional right triggering a
different level of scrutiny, see supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text; Kelso, supra note 3, at
9-11; Kelso, supra note 2, at 510-12.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 60-65.
. Even the majority opinion, which upheld the state law in Timmons, did so only after a care-
ful and detailed analysis of the government's interests in the case. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363-70.
'Id. at 383 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he midlevel scrutiny that applies in commercial
speech cases, which is similar to what we apply here, '[u]nlike rational basis review ... does not
permit us to supplant the precise interests put forward by the State with other suppositions.'"
(alteration in original) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993))).
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Stevens's dissent also appeared to adopt an intermediate form of
scrutiny."m Because of its willingness to consider conceivable gov-
ernment interests, the majority opinion is best viewed as either sec-
ond-order or third-order rational review, depending on whether the
majority thinks the challenger or the government has the burden of
establishing the constitutionality of the government action. 4 The
majority's language in Timmons about the government needing "im-
portant" regulatory interests, rather than merely "legitimate" inter-
ests, an intermediate, rather than rational review inquiry into gov-
ernmental interests, appears to be completely unnecessary to the
case, and to serve no useful purpose. The language in Timmons about
the state's interest needing to be "sufficiently weighty" is best handled
under second-order rational review by the real balancing test of bene-
fits and burdens that takes place at second-order review."5 Indeed,
when cataloguing the state's interests, the majority noted that
"[s] tates certainly have an interest in protecting the integrity, fairness,
and efficiency of their ballots and election processes,""' without any
further finding that those interests were important or substantial.
Thus, the Court should recast the majority opinion in Timmons as an
example of second-order rational review, instead of creating a new,
rationally related to important government interest test, unused in
any other context, and unnecessary to resolve the Timmons case.
The use in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of a substantial rela-
tionship to a legitimate government interest test 17 is similarly a mis-
take. In adopting this test, the Court relied in part on the earlier case
of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission."8 The Court noted in Del
Monte Dunes that given "the posture of the case before us" the Court
would "decline" to revisit the Nollan precedent in this case.1 9 As with
the term "sufficiently weighty" in Timmons, the greater than minimal
rationality review scrutiny required by use of the phrase "substantial
113 Id. at 377-78 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg & Souter,Jj., dissenting). For discussion of
consideration of only the interests put forward in litigation representing an intermediate level
of review, see supra note 107 and accompanying text.
.. The burden appears to be on the challenger in Timmons, and thus it presents another ex-
ample of second-order rational review. See id& at 369-70 (citing to the similar voting rights case
of Burdick v. Takush4 504 U.S. 428, 437-38 (1992), and discussing whether the Court "rejected
the petitioner's argument" in the case, thus suggesting that the challenger had the burden of
proof in the case).
5 See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
520 U.S. at 364.
' 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999) ("[A]lthough this Court has provided neither a definitive state-
ment of the elements of a claim for a temporary regulatory taking nor a thorough explanation
of the nature or applicability of the requirement that a regulation substantially advance legiti-
mate public interests outside the context of required dedications or exactions," the Court up-
held the trial court's jury instructions laying out the test of what constitutes a regulatory tak-
ing.).
11 Id. (citing 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 n.3 (1987)).
11. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 704.
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relationship" in Nollan is best handled by the real balancing test of
benefits and burdens of government action that takes place at sec-
ond-order rational review. 20 Thus, whenever the Court decides to re-
visit Takings Clause precedents, it is hoped that the Nollan/Del Monte
Dunes test can be recast as a version of second-order rational review,1
2 '
while acknowledging Dolan v. City of Tigard as third-order rational re-
view, since the government bears the burden of demonstrating the
constitutionality of its action in Dolan.1
22
The Court's recent opinions regarding the proper standard of re-
view to apply to regulations of cable television are also problematic.
Recent cases in this area have failed to produce any clear majority-
endorsed standard of review.23 Part of the problem may lie in the
Court's official focus upon intermediate review or strict scrutiny as
the only two heightened scrutiny choices. Some members of the
Court perhaps think that strict scrutiny, applicable to newspapers and
books, 24 is too rigorous,'125 while other members of the Court may feel
that intermediate review, applicable to over-the-air radio and televi-
sion, 26 is too loose.27 Under the "base plus six" model of levels of re-
view, perhaps this impasse can be resolved. Like regulations of com-
mercial speech, cable television regulation may be an appropriate
area for intermediate review with bite, as I have previously sug-
SSee supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text (discussing second-order rational review).
' Neither Timmons nor Nollan/Del Monte Dunes represent third-order rational review, since
in each case the challenger appears to bear the burden of proving that the government action
is unconstitutional. See supra note 64 (discussing the challengers' burden in Timmons and Nol-
lan/Del Monte Dunes).
" See supra note 65.
See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (declin-
ing to adopt a per se standard of review in First Amendment cases); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a federal law requiring cable tele-
vision systems to carry a certain amount of local stations).
'2' See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that a state
statute that mandated publication of specified editorials in a newspaper violated the First
Amendment).
' See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 739-41 (Breyer, J.) (plurality opin-
ion). Justices Stevens and Souter concurred in the opinion, while Justice O'Connor concurred
in part and dissented in part. All of the Justices, however, joined Justice Breyer in Part II of his
opinion, where he recognized that strict scrutiny may be too rigorous in some First Amendment
media cases. See id. at 740-42. See also id. at 777-78 (SouterJ., concurring).
"' See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (using intermediate review in
holding that federal ban on editorializing in noncommercial television and radio violates the
First Amendment).
'27 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 820-23 (1996) (Thomas & Scalia,_J.,
& Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing adop-
tion of an intermediate standard of review rather than strict scrutiny for cable television regula-
tion); it. at 784-87 (Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (sug-
gesting that strict scrutiny is the proper standard to use, at least in the context of "public and
leased access programmers whose speech is put at risk nationwide by these laws").
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gested,2' or loose strict scrutiny, following the model of Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Bush v. Vera.'Y9
Two final cases provide useful examples of the advantage of ex-
plicit acknowledgment of the "base plus six" model for determining
standards of review. In City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.,s'° both the plurality
opinion of Justice O'Connor, 1 and Justice Souter's dissent,3 2 pur-
ported to apply the content-neutral regulation of free speech test of
United States v. O'Brien to Erie's nude dancing regulation.'ss However,
because of a lack of attention to the basic elements of this test in both
O Brien and in Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, the plurality
opinion failed to apply O'Brien properly, and instead adopted a "wa-
tered-down" version of the O'Brien test."
At issue in O'Brien was whether a government statute banning the
burning of draft cards violated the First Amendment right to freedom
of speech 5 In Pap's, as well as prior cases, the Supreme Court
viewed the O'Brien test as a version of intermediate review.136 As noted
earlier, under traditional intermediate review the government has the
burden to demonstrate that the statute advances substantial or im-
portant governmental interests, that the statute is substantially related
' See Kelso, supra note 3, at 32-35.
'"517 U.S. 952 (1996). On Bush v. Vera, see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. For
example, Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg might be able to reach a compromise with the plural-
ity in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium-Justices Breyer, Stevens, O'Connor
and Souter, see supra note 127-to command a majority for loose strict scrutiny. Or perhaps
Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg will unite with Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, see supra note 127, to command a majority for traditional strict scrutiny. In either
event, a majority of the Court adopting some specific level of scrutiny for cable television regu-
lation would aid predictability and certainty in the law.
120 S. Ct. 1382 (2000).
' See id. at 1387,1395 (plurality opinion) (O'ConnorJ.,joined by Rehnquist, CJ., Kennedy
& BreyerJJ.).
' See id at 1402 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1388 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
" In this respect, the plurality opinion in Pap's A.M. is similar to the Court's opinion in the
commercial speech case of Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328
(1986), which watered down the commercial speech test of Central Hudson Gas &Electric Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Eventually, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484 (1996), a majority of the Court, including the author of Posadas dePuerto Rico Associates,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, acknowledged that Posadas represented an improper application of
Central Hudson, and to that extent was overruled. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 509-10 (Stev-
ens, J., joined by Kennedy, Thomas, & Ginsburg, JJ.); id. at 531-32 (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, CJ., Souter & Breyer,_J.).
." 391 U.S. at 369.
•.. See Pap's A.M., 120 S. Ct. at 1394 (O'ConnorJ.) (analogizing O'Brien to Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984), which adopted an intermediate "nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest" test, and Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
cism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 & n.6 (1989), which also adopted intermediate "narrowly tailored"
analysis, explicitly rejecting the strict scrutiny "least restrictive alternative" test); Pap's A.M., 120
S. Ct. at 1402 (Souter, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that in cases like
O'Brien "we have confronted the need for factual justifications to satisfy intermediate scrutiny
under the FirstAmendment").
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to advancing those interests, and that the statute is not substantially
more burdensome than necessary. 37 In the First Amendment con-
text, the Court usually requires that for a statute not to be substan-
tially burdensome the statute must "leave open ample alternative
channels for communication."'- The Court's opinion in O'Brien re-
quired each of these elements.
As to the first element, the Court concluded in O'Brien that the
government's interest "in having a system for raising armies that
functions with maximum efficiency and is capable of easily and
quickly responding to continually changing circumstances" was a "vi-
tal interest," thus satisfying the requirement that the government's
interest be important or substantial.'39 Second, the Court required
the government to establish "that the continuing availability to each
registrant of his Selective Service certificates substantially furthers the
smooth and proper functioning of the system that Congress has es-
tablished to raise armies." 140 Indeed, the Court spent a number of
pages in its opinion discussing how the requirement of a certificate
substantially furthers the government's interest, thus giving the gov-
ernment a "substantial interest in preventing their wanton and unre-
strained destruction." 4' Finally, the Court noted that the statute was
"an appropriately narrow means of protecting [the government's] in-
terest and condemns only the independent non-communicative im-
pact of conduct within its reach.",
4 2
When summing up this approach in O'Brien, however, the Court
conflated the inquiry of government ends and the inquiry into statu-
tory means. The Court concluded that because the statute involved
"vital" government ends, and "substantially furthers" the govern-
ment's ends, that meant the government had a "substantial interest"
in assuring the continued existence of Selective Service certificates. 43
The Court then phrased the O'Brien test as whether the government
regulation "furthers an important or substantial governmental inter-
est."' 44
Devoid of the context of the rest of the Court's opinion in O'Brien,
this phrasing of the test may suggest that the government only
needed to show some rational reason to believe that its interest is fur-
thered to some extent-a kind of rational relationship test. This is
how Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Pap's A.M. read the
O'Brien test, accusing Justice Souter, in his dissent, of "conflat[ing]
" See supra notes 17, 37 and accompanying text.
Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
391 U.S. at 381 (emphasis added).
' Id. (emphasis added).
... Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
Id. at 381.
.. Id. at 377.
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two distinct concepts under O'Brien: whether there is a substantial
government interest and whether the regulation furthers that inter-
est. 1 45 However, when O'Brien is read in context, the Court clearly
required the statute to "substantially further" the government's inter-
est. As noted above, the Court's use of the phrase "substantial gov-
ernment interest" in O'Brien included both a requirement that the
government's interest be "substantial" and that the statute "substan-
tially further" those ends.46 Thus, to be consistent with O'Brien, one
should consider the O'Brien test as the standard phrasing under in-
termediate scrutiny: that the statute substantially further important
or substantial governmental interests, and not be substantially more
burdensome than necessary. Additionally, as an intermediate scru-
tiny test, the government has the burden in O'Brien to make this
showing, which is whatJustice Souter required in his dissent in Pap's
A.M.1
47
A similar conflation of means and ends routinely occurs in cases
involving race-based affirmative action in education. In the typical
case, courts ask whether having a diverse student body is a compelling
government interest1 FollowingJustice Powell's plurality opinion in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 49 most lower courts have
concluded there is a compelling government interest,5 ' but some
courts have not.'5' This way of phrasing the issue, however, is wrong.
" Pap'sA.M., 120 S. Ct. at 1396-97.
See supra notes 13941,143-144 and accompanying text.
120 S. Ct. at 1404-05 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In applying
this test, however, Justice O'Connor is right in stating in her plurality opinion that the govern-
ment need not always conduct its own studies, "so long as whatever evidenie the city relies upon
is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses." Id. at 1395 (quot-
ing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986)). But the ultimate burden of
proof should remain on the government, as it did in both O'Brien and Playtime Theatres. See
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382 ("In conclusion, we find that because of the Government's substantial
interest... a sufficient governmental interest has been shown tojustif O'Brien's conviction.");
Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 50-51 (noting that while the "Court of Appeals imposed on the city
an unnecessarily rigid burden of proof," the burden still remained on Renton, which was "enti-
fled to rely on the experiences of Seattle and other cities, and in particular on the 'detailed
findings' summarized in the Washington Supreme Court's Northend Cinema opinion, in enacting
its adult theater zoning ordinance"). The Supreme Court will have an opportunity either to
correct or compound this problem during its 2001 term. The Court recently granted certiorari
in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 222 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 1223
(2001), a case involving the secondary effects of an adult bookstore/arcade in Los Angeles, in
which the O'Brien/Playtime Theatres test again will be applied.
" See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests: Equal Protection
Jurisprudence at the Crossroads, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 260, 266 n.36 (2002) (citing, inter alia,
Hunter ex reL Brandt v. Regents of the University of California, 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999);
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996)).
" 438 U.S. 265, 311-13 (1978) (discussing the asserted goal of maintaining a diverse student
body).
"0 See Bhagwat, supra note 148, at 263-69, 266 nn.32-42 and accompanying text (discussing
Hunter ex rel Brandt; Brewer v. West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000),
Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000), and Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch.,
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The real question of government ends in these cases is whether
there is a compelling government interest in effective and efficient
education. That is the end that governments seek regarding educa-
tion. 52 Diversity in the student body is one means to obtain this end.
As Justice Powell indicated in Bakke, merely having diversity for diver-
sity's sake is not only not a compelling government interest, it is not
even a legitimate interest.' Properly understood, then, the strict
scrutiny analysis that should take place in race-based affirmative ac-
tion cases involving education is as follows: (1) is there a compelling
governmental interest in education; (2) is having a diverse student
body directly related to advancing this interest; and (3) is the affirm a-
tive action program adopting the least restrictive alternative that
would effectively advance the government's interest in education.1
This first question of governmental interest should be a question
of law for the court to resolve. Whether a particular governmental
interest is illegitimate, legitimate, important, or compelling typically
does not turn upon the facts of any particular case, but on the nature
of the interest. Certain interests, like prejudice against the mentally
impaired, are not legitimate;1 5 interests like administrative cost con-siderations, while legitimate, are not important;156 interests like diver-
233 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2192 (2001)).
"' See Bhagwat, supra note 148, at 264 nn.19-23, 268 n.48 and accompanying text (discussing
Hopwood andJohnson v. Bd. of Regents, 106 F. Supp. 2d. 1362 (S.D. Ga. 2000)).
' See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("[It shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to
establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of
public free schools."). See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989)
(discussing Article 7 of the Texas Constitution).
' Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 ("If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body some
specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a
preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid." Further,
"[p]referring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is dis-
crimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids.").
" Of course, a similar tracking of standard strict scrutiny analysis should also be applied in
other affirmative action cases. For example, in Wttmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996),
discussed in Bhagwat, supra note 148, at 277-78 nn.75-78, the Court had to decide whether a
prison could adopt a racial preference in hiring officers for a "boot camp" for young, non-
violent criminal offenders. The Court analyzed the case as whether the government had a
compelling government interest in staffing a diverse group of officers for the boot camp. Witt-
mer, 87 F.3d at 919-20. The proper analysis should have been: (1) is having an effective, reha-
bilitative "boot camp" program a compelling government interest; (2) is having a diverse group
of officers directly related to a successful "boot camp" program; and (3) is the extent of the af-
firmative action program adopted to achieve that diverse group the least restrictive alternative
that will effectively advance the government's rehabilitative end.
" See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 ("Private biases"
against the mentally impaired "may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly
or indirectly, give them effect." (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984))), dis-
cussed supra notes 13, 24.
" See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977) (noting that simply "sav[ing] the Gov-
ernment time, money, and effort... [does] not suffice to justify a gender-based discrimination
in the distribution of employment-related benefits").
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sity in broadcast programming, are important, but not compelling;' 7
and certain interests, like remedying prior racial discrimination, are
compelling.58  In this case, I assume that it is uncontroversial that
education is a compelling government interest, particularly for state
governments where most educational affirmative action takes place.5 9
In contrast to governmental ends, the two means questions of the
statute's relationship to benefits and burdens are fact questions which
depend on the particular program before the court for their proper
resolution. Thus, after hearing the government's evidence, since the
government bears the burden in these cases, a district court should
decide whether having a racially diverse student body is directly re-
lated to efficient and effective education,16° and whether the particu-
lar program is the least restrictive alternative to achieving these edu-
cational benefits.161
"' See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354-55 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that "diverse programming" in broadcasting, even if an "important" government interest is
not "compelling") (citations omitted).
'53 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("The unhappy persis-
tence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority
groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting
in response to it."), cert. granted sub nom. Adarand v. Mineta, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001) cert. dismissed
as improvidently granted, 122 S. Ct. 511 (2001). Regarding the question raised by Professor
Bhagwat of whether in the context of challenges to race-conscious decision making there are
any compelling governmental ends other than remedying prior racial discrimination, see
Bhagwvat, supra note 148 and text accompanying note 63, many court opinions have held, or
strongly implied, that such additional compelling governmental interests exist. See, e.g., Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996) (O'ConnorJ, concurring) ("[C]ompliance with the... Voting
Rights Act (VRA) is a compelling state interest."); Bakke 438 U.S. at 310 ("improving the deliv-
ery of health-care services to communities currently underserved" is "assumed" to be "suffi-
ciently compelling to support the use of a suspect classification"); Hunter, 190 F.3d at 1063
("California's interest in the operation of a research-oriented elementary school dedicated to
improving the quality of education in urban public schools is a compelling state interest"); Brewer
v. West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[W]e are bound by this
Court's determination in Andrew Jackson I and II that a compelling interest can be found in a
program that has as its object the reduction of racial isolation and what appears to be defacto
segregation.").
" See generally Hunter, 170 F.3d at 1063 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954)) ("[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments."
(alteration in original)). As Professor Bhagwat notes, currently courts are split on the question
of whether analyzing government ends is a fact question or question of law. See Bhagwat, supra
note 148 and text accompanying note 62. However, that may be because the courts have been
conflating the means and ends inquiries by asking whether having a diverse student body in the
context before the court is a compelling government interest. See supra notes 148-51 and ac-
companying text. Once it is understood that this way of viewing the question is wrong, it should
become clear that the proper question of governmental ends, such as whether efficient educa-
tion is a compelling governmental interest, is a question of law for the court to resolve.
" As a professor, I think it is obvious that having a racially diverse student body is directly
related to efficient and effective education. For non-professors, however, it may be necessary to
marshal the evidence.
'G' This prong of the strict scrutiny test is the most difficult to meet. It will depend upon the
factual circumstances of each case whether there are less restrictive alternatives than the par-
ticular affirmative action program adopted by the institution that would advance as effectively
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CONCLUSION
This Article has discussed the various levels of scrutiny used by the
Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of governmental
action under the Equal Protection Clause and related constitutional
doctrines that deal with individual rights, such as due process or the
freedom of speech. Part I discussed the current standards of review
in terms of seven basic levels of review used by the Court in different
contexts. These seven levels involve a base level of minimum ration-
ality review, and then six levels of heightened scrutiny: two height-
ened rational review levels; two intermediate levels of review; and two
levels of strict scrutiny. This approach is named in this Article the
"base plus six" model of review.
Building on this "base plus six" model of review, Part II of this Ar-
ticle discussed the problems posed by the increased proliferation of
levels of review beyond these seven levels that have occurred in some
recent Supreme Court cases. Part III noted that since all of the re-
cent troublesome cases are capable of reconceptualization as part of
the "base plus six" model, the Court should simply follow the "base
plus six" model of review. That model gives the Court a flexible set of
the government's compelling interest in efficient and effective education.
Despite this difficulty, for progressives worried about upholding affirmative action pro-
grams, this approach is more likely to result in the programs being upheld than trying to con-
vince the Court to adopt a new theory of equal protection, which on normative grounds will
uphold these programs. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection,
85 MINN. L. REv. 1, 17 (2000) (advocating refocusing equal protection doctrine around "the
principle of equal concern" for groups, rather than individuals, i.e., focusing on whether af-
firmative action harms "white students" as a group, rather than the obvious concrete harm to
"individual white applicants"). The major difficulties with convincing the Court to adopt this
approach are the text of the Equal Protection Clause, which states that it protects "any person"
from discrimination, and the Court's holding in Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-25, 227, that the
Equal Protection Clause does indeed protect "individuals," not "groups." See also Stephen E.
Gottlieb, Tears for Tiers on the Rehnquist Court, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 350 (2002) (advocating re-
thinking the intent test of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). The major difficulty with
this approach is the Court's continued adherence to the Davis test, although perhaps a slight
modification of the test may be possible. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. CL
955, 968 (2001) (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring). In Board of Trustees of the
University ofAlabamaJustice Kennedy wrote:
Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises not from malice or hostile animus
alone. It may result as well from insensitivity caused by simple want of careful, rational
reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard against people who appear to be
different in some respects from ourselves .... [However the] failure of a State to revise
policies now seen as incorrect under a new understanding of proper policy does not al-
ways constitute the purposeful and intentional action required to make out a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 968. Similarly, given the institutional stake the Court has in the levels of scrutiny, see supra
note 75, the suggestion that all strict and intermediate scrutiny be scrapped so that legislative
effects of race-based affirmative action will not have to be analyzed under a heightened stan-
dard of review, is not likely to meet with much success. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 73, at 301-04.
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choices for the appropriate level of scrutiny while providing needed
predictability and guidance to lower courts in their application of
whatever level of scrutiny is appropriately applied.
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APPENDIX 62
Levels of Review of the Constitutionality of Government Action:
The "Base Plus Six" Model of Review
Level of Scrutiny Government Statutory Means to Ends
Ends
Government Relationship Burdens
Interest to be to Benefits
Advanced
"Base" Minimum Rationality Review
Minimum Rational Legitimate Rational Not Irrational' 6'
Review (substantial (substantial
deference to deference to
gov't) gov't)
The "Plus Six" Standards of Increased Scrutiny
Heightened Rational Review Standards
Basic Rational or Sec- Legitimate Rational Not Irrational 4
ond-Order Review: As (no substantial (no substantial (no substantial
with minimum rational- deference to deference to deference to
ity review, challenger gov't) gov't) gov't)
has the burden to prove
that the statute is un-
constitutional
"' This Table is a condensed version of a similar table that appears at Kelso, supra note 2, at
585-89 app. a, tbl.1. The main difference is the addition in this Table of a seventh level of scru-
tiny, loose strict scrutiny, which the Court used in the recent case of Bush v. Vera. See supra text
accompanying notes 41-43. The phrases "substantial deference to government" and "no sub-
stantial deference to government" reflect the difference between the deference given to the
government's choice of means and ends under minimum rationality review, and the fact that
such deference is not given under second-order or third-order rational review. See supra notes
26-32, 34 & 94 and accompanying text.
l This standard of review is summarized at supra notes 16, 22-25 and accompanying text.
' This standard of review is summarized at supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
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Heightened Rational Review Standards, Cont.
Rational Review with Legitimate Rational Not Irrational's
Bite or Third-Order Re- (no substantial (no substantial (no substantial
view: Burden shifts to deference to deference to deference to
the government to gov't) gov't) gov't)
prove that the statute is
constitutional. The
burden remains on the
government for all ver-
sions of intermediate
and strict scrutiny review
Intermediate Review Standards
Intermediate Review Substantial/ Substantially Not Substan-
important Related tially'6 More
Burdensome
Than Necessary
Intermediate Review Substantial/ Directly Not Substan-








Strict Scrutiny Review Compelling Directly Least Restric-
Related tivel19 Alterna-
tive
This standard of review is summarized at supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
l6 This standard of review is summarized at supra notes 17, 37 and accompanying text.
" This standard of review is summarized at supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
This standard of review is summarized at supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
' This standard of review is summarized at supra notes 18, 38 and accompanying text
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